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State Immunity: Reassessing the Boundaries of Judicial Autonomy in Hong Kong 
Cora Chan* 
 
Ever   since   the  establishment  of   “one  country,   two   systems”   in  Hong  Kong,   there  has  been  
continuing controversy pertaining to the boundaries of judicial autonomy in Hong Kong vis-
à-vis the People’s  Republic  of  China  (“China”).  In  particular,  the  definition  of  “act  of  state”  
and  “foreign  affair”  – matters that are excluded from the jurisdiction of courts in Hong Kong 
– has been unclear. In FG Hemisphere v Democratic Republic of Congo1 (“Congo”),  a rare 
opportunity  in  Hong  Kong’s  history  to  explore  this  issue,  Hong  Kong’s  Court  of  Final  Appeal  
(“CFA”)   ruled by a 3:2 majority that the decision as to what the law on state immunity is 
constitutes a foreign affair, and the Chinese  authorities’  determination  on such an issue is an 
act of state. This article argues that the ruling has to some extent clarified the limits of 
judicial autonomy in Hong Kong, but failed to secure the maximum boundaries of autonomy 
permissible under its constitution, the Basic Law. 
 
Boundaries of judicial autonomy 
 
The Basic Law enshrines that Hong Kong practises the common law legal system, which is 
markedly different from China’s   Socialist   legal system.2 The key to this co-existence of 
systems lies in giving courts in Hong Kong the final power of adjudication over all matters 
except acts of state (art.19), which include foreign affairs – an area that falls within the 
exclusive responsibility of the Chinese authorities (art.13(1)). Beijing’s  Standing  Committee 
of  the  National  People’s  Congress  (“NPCSC”)  has plenary powers of interpreting the Basic 
Law and authorises courts in Hong Kong to interpret the same during adjudication 
(art.158(1)-(2)). If the CFA needs to interpret an excluded provision, i.e. a provision that 
concerns the responsibility of the Chinese authorities, in order to dispose of a case, it must 
seek a binding interpretation from the NPCSC before delivering a judgment (art.158(3)). It is 
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established that the need to interpret as opposed to merely apply a provision only arises if the 
meaning of the provision in the case is arguable.3 
While this may be a coherent framework, it leaves a crucial question unanswered: what 
is “act of state” and   “foreign   affair”? It is clear that the NPCSC has final powers of 
interpreting these jurisdiction-excluding concepts, but it is unclear how courts in Hong Kong, 
applying common law principles, would interpret   them.   Despite   the   NPCSC’s   ultimate 
powers of interpretation, it is important to explore the latter question, for the following 
reasons. 
The Basic Law gives ample space to the courts of Hong Kong to determine the 
boundaries of their power using the common law approach, in the absence of prior 
interpretations issued by the NPCSC. Firstly,   the  CFA’s   interpretations of the jurisdiction-
excluding concepts will determine whether it will request the NPCSC to interpret these 
concepts pursuant to art.158(3). It   is   established   that   if   in   the   court’s   view   clearly and 
unarguably no such jurisdiction-excluding matter is involved in the case, then the case can be 
disposed of without the need to interpret and hence seek reference on arts 13 and 19, which 
are indisputably excluded provisions. This position has been affirmed by practice in every 
case since the handover: until Congo, courts in Hong Kong had never sought an interpretation 
of arts 13 and 19 because in their view clearly no foreign affair or act of state had ever been 
involved.4  
Secondly, if based on its own understandings of these jurisdiction-excluding concepts 
the CFA decides not to seek reference, then such understandings will stand unless and until 
the NPCSC issues a contrary interpretation, because interpretations issued by the NPCSC do 
not affect judgments previously rendered (art.158(3)). For these reasons, the boundaries of 
judicial autonomy are significantly affected by how courts in Hong Kong define them. In 
light  of  this,  we  turn  now  to  explore  the  CFA’s  ruling  in  Congo, which has shed light on how 
it defines the excluding concepts. 
 
The Congo case 
 
                                                 
3 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315 (CFA), at 344; Congo at [84, 398, 404, 521]. 
Cf. the acte clair test in the EU, where national courts need not seek a preliminary ruling if the correct 
application of the relevant EU law is free from doubt. 
4 E.g. Courts had ruled on refoulement, recognition of a Taiwanese judgment, and customary international law 
without seeking reference on whether these matters constitute foreign affairs in the context, because in the 
courts’  view  they  clearly  do not. 
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In this case, FG Hemisphere, a US distressed debt fund, sought to enforce two ICC awards it 
had  bought  against   the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (“the  Congo”)  by  garnishing  certain  
funds in Hong Kong. These funds were payable by a consortium of Chinese enterprises to the 
Congo in exchange for mining rights there. 
At issue was whether the Congo was immune from the courts of Hong Kong, which 
depends in turn on whether Hong Kong recognises sovereign immunity in all cases (“absolute  
immunity”)   or only for non-commercial acts (“restrictive   immunity”). The English State 
Immunity Act 1978 (“SIA”), which codified the restrictive doctrine, was extended to colonial 
Hong Kong, but lapsed with the handover. Since then, no new legislation (whether local or 
extended from China, which adopts absolute immunity) has been put in place. 
The Congo, the Chinese consortium, and the Secretary for Justice who effectively 
represented   China’s   position,   argued   that   absolute   immunity   applied   and   the   Congo   was  
immune. Three letters issued by the Chinese authorities were placed before the courts, urging 
that  if  Hong  Kong  courts  departed  from  the  absolute  doctrine  adopted  by  China,  the  latter’s  
foreign relations would be prejudiced. 
The Court of First Instance found for the Congo, but its decision was reversed by the 
Court of Appeal. Amongst the range of issues put forward to the CFA, the court focused on 
two key points: first, whether Hong Kong may depart from the doctrine of state immunity 
adopted by China; secondly, whether the CFA must make a request under art.158(3) to the 
NPCSC to interpret arts 13 and 19, which are accepted unanimously by the court as excluded 
provisions, on the ground that the court needs to interpret them to dispose of the case. 
In June 2011, the majority held provisionally,  subject  to  the  NPCSC’s  interpretation,  that  
Hong Kong may not depart  from  China’s  doctrine  of  state  immunity.  The  majority  arrived  at  
this conclusion through various strands of reasoning, the most crucial of which, for our 
purposes, is its arguments on jurisdiction: adoption of the doctrine of state immunity is a 
foreign affair outwith Hong Kong courts’ jurisdiction.  China’s  determination  that  Hong  Kong  
should adopt absolute immunity is an unreviewable act of state to which the CFA was bound 
to give effect.5 The majority further held that such a view is arguable, and for the first time 
invoked the reference procedure under art.158(3), requesting the NPCSC to issue an 
interpretation   on,   inter   alia,   whether   the   Chinese   government’s   determination   of   the  
applicable doctrine of immunity in Hong Kong constitutes an act of state; and whether arts 13 
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and   19   require   Hong   Kong   to   adhere   to   China’s   law   on   state   immunity.6 The NPCSC 
subsequently issued an interpretation (“Interpretation”), answering these questions in the 
affirmative  and  in  line  with  the  majority’s  understanding.7 The  latter’s  provisional  judgment  
has since been rendered final. 
Contrary   to   the  majority’s   view,   the  minority   considered   it   clear   in   common   law   that  
questions about the applicable doctrine of state immunity are questions of law for the courts 
to decide in the absence of legislation.8 It further held that since clearly no foreign affair or 
act of state was involved, there was no need to interpret, and thus seek reference on, arts 13 
and 19.9 
This  article  will   focus  on  examining   the  court’s   ruling  on   jurisdiction.  This   is  because  
firstly,   the   majority   and   minority’s   arguments   on   this   issue   formed   the   basis   of   their  
respective arguments on whether to seek reference. Secondly, as compared to the  majority’s  
decisions  on  other  issues,  its  decision  to  oust  the  court’s  jurisdiction  is  likely  to  pose  the  most  
significant impact on judicial autonomy in Hong Kong. 
 
State immunity law and foreign affair 
 
Whether the CFA has jurisdiction to determine the applicable law on state immunity turns on 
what the terms “foreign affair” and “act of state” in arts 13 and 19 mean. The CFA 
unanimously and rightly affirmed the well-established position that it must interpret these 
provisions using the common law approach, which seeks to ascertain the meaning borne by 
the language of the provisions in light of their context and purpose .10  
The starting point for the CFA is therefore to ascertain what the language of the 
provisions means at common law. The next stage of the enquiry would be to see if such 
common law meaning is compatible with the legislative context of those provisions, such as 
other provisions of the Basic Law that also deal with the constitutional status of Hong 
Kong.11 If the meaning of the excluding concepts at common law is incompatible with other 
provisions of the Basic Law, such a meaning cannot survive.12 The CFA unanimously 
                                                 
6 Congo at [404-407]. 
7 Interpretation by the NPCSC of Basic Law arts 13(1) and 19, adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Eleventh National  People’s  Congress at its 22nd Session on August 26, 2011. 
8 Congo at [85, 500], per Bokhary PJ and Mortimer NPJ. 
9 Congo at [84, 521]. 
10 Congo at [310]. 
11 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315, at [75] (CFA); Director of Immigration v 
Chong Fung Yuen [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533, s.6.3 (CFA) 
12 Basic Law arts 8, 160. 
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accepted (whether explicitly or implicitly) that in the absence of a prior interpretation issued 
by  the  NPCSC,  the  court’s  role is to assess the question of compatibility by reading the Basic 
Law from the perspective of a common law court.13 It need not speculate whether the NPCSC 
will find the common law meaning of the excluding concepts compatible with the Basic Law. 
If this approach were correctly applied, it would have been unequivocal that no foreign 
affair or act of state was involved. As the minority judges argued, it is well-established at 
common law that while courts do not have jurisdiction over foreign affairs and acts of state,14 
and are bound by certificates of facts of foreign policies within the peculiar cognizance of the 
executive, they generally do have jurisdiction over questions of municipal and international 
law.15 The law on state immunity has been established as falling within this general rule. 
Hong   Kong’s   courts   have   considered   such   law   and   even   held   in   favour   of   restrictive 
immunity as far back as in 1956.16 The English courts changed the law on state immunity to 
embrace restrictive immunity before the SIA was enacted.17 Courts in many other common 
law jurisdictions have also ruled on the doctrine of state immunity as a question of law in the 
absence of legislation.18 Such doctrine has never been considered at common law as a foreign 
affair outside the jurisdiction of courts.19 
That this long-standing position should have been applied in Hong Kong is reinforced 
once we consider the legislative purpose and context. Article 19 itself provides that 
restrictions on   the   courts’   jurisdiction   are limited to those imposed before the handover. 
Numerous provisions in the Basic Law stipulate the continuity of the previous legal system,20 
as did a pre-promulgation explanation of art.19 given by the Chairman of the drafting 
                                                 
13 Both the majority and minority justified their views of the Basic Law with common law principles. E.g. 
Congo at [267, 310-331].  
14 This position was affirmed recently in Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758 (UK 
Court of Appeal), at [209-210]. 
15 Carl Zeiss Sitftung v Rayner & Keeler [1967] 1 A.C. 853 (House of Lords); F.A. Mann, Foreign Affairs in 
English Courts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), at pp.2-4 23, 51-54, ch.2. I  say  “generally”,  because  there  were  
exceptional cases where courts  gave  effect  to  the  executive’s  views  on  questions  of  law  that  affected  high  acts  of  
foreign policy. E.g. Re Westinghouse Uranium Contract [1978]  A.C.  547;;  Lawrence  Collins,  “Foreign  Relations  
and the Judiciary”  (2002)  51  I.C.L.Q.  485,  487. 
16 Midland Investment Co. Ltd v Bank of Communications (1956) 40 H.K.L.R. 42. 
17 Philippine Admiral v Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd [1977] A.C. 373 (Privy Council); Trendex Trading 
Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529 (UK Court of Appeal); Playa Larga v I Congreso del Partido 
[1983] 1 A.C. 244 (House of Lords). 
18 E.g. Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, India, Malaysia, Pakistan. See also Congo at [113], per 
Bokhary PJ. 
19 Cf  P.J.  Yap,  “Congo v FG Hemisphere: Why Absolute Immunity Should Apply but a Reference 
Unnecessary”  (2011)  41  Hong Kong Law Journal 393. 
20 Basic Law arts 5, 8, 18, 81. 
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committee.21 If Hong Kong courts had jurisdiction under the previous system to decide state 
immunity law in the absence of legislation, continuity suggests that this should also be the 
case after the handover. To this the majority put forward three arguments,22 all of which, I 
argue, do not stand up to examination. 
 
Nature of sovereign immunity 
 
The  majority  argues  that  since  the  nature  of  sovereign  immunity  “concerns  relations  between  
states”,  questions  of   immunity  – be they questions of law or questions of recognition – are 
matters of foreign affairs; the Chinese government’s determinations of these questions 
constitute acts (of state) performed in the course of its relations with foreign states.23 
According to this logic, all issues that concern relations between states, which would 
include most international law issues, would be categorically foreign affairs outside the 
court’s  jurisdiction,  and  the  Chinese  authorities’  determinations  thereof,  unchallengeable acts 
of state.24 This novel reading of the excluding concepts is radically overbroad by common 
law standards, according to which questions of law, even those that implicate relations 
between states, are generally for the courts to decide. A recent example is Binyam 
Mohamed,25 where the English Court of Appeal ordered the disclosure of intelligence 
communication between the US and UK notwithstanding   such   disclosure’s potential 
prejudice on the future intelligence relations between the two states. Further examples are 
where courts determined principles of international law. The   majority’s   argument   is  
ungrounded in existing doctrine. 
 
Constitutional allocation of powers 
 
The  majority’s   second   argument   can   be   read   as   a   strong   or  weak   claim.   The   strong   claim  
goes, that common law jurisprudence shows that the branch of government that has been 
                                                 
21 Explanation of the Draft Basic Law given to the Third Session of the Seventh National  People’s  Congress  by  
Ji Pengfei, Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law on March 28, 1990, para.17.  
22 These  arguments  overlapped  with  the  majority’s  arguments  on  other  questions. I organised these arguments 
largely according to the summary of issues that the majority advanced at [264-269]. 
23 Congo at [226-233, 241, 247, 265, 321, 327, 348-355]. 
24 Tony   Carty,   “Why are Hong Kong Judges Keeping a Distance from International Law, and with what 
Consequences? Reflections on the CFA Decision in DRC v FG Hemisphere”   (2011)   41 Hong Kong Law 
Journal 401, at 405. 
25 The Queen on the application of Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)).  
7 
 
allocated exclusive authority over foreign affairs by the constitution will be responsible for 
deciding the law on state immunity, in the absence of legislation.26 Evidence – (a): The US 
constitution allocates exclusive authority over foreign affairs to the executive. Before the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (“FSIA”)  was enacted, there was a phase in which 
US  courts   followed   the  executive’s   suggestions  on  whether   to  grant   immunity.  This   shows  
that US courts have no jurisdiction to decide the law on state immunity in the absence of 
legislation.27 (b): In contrast, UK courts could decide the law on state immunity before the 
SIA was enacted because UK’s unwritten constitution was flexible enough to allow courts to 
decide foreign affairs.28 
This argument concludes, since the Basic Law allocates foreign affairs exclusively to the 
Chinese authorities, only the latter can decide the law on state immunity.29 
The reasoning in (b) is flawed. Powers for conducting foreign affairs are reserved 
exclusively for the executive in both the US and UK. That the allocation is done by way of an 
unwritten constitution in the latter makes no relevant difference.30 That UK courts changed 
the law on state immunity is a counter-example that defeats the strong claim. 
The weak claim is it is not clear in common law that courts have jurisdiction to decide 
the law on state immunity since in at least one jurisdiction – the US – courts were barred 
from doing so.31 This argument ignores the position in most other common law jurisdictions, 
where courts have decided the law on state immunity. But this aside, even the reasoning in (a) 
is  flawed.  One  must  distinguish  the  barring  of  courts’  jurisdiction  over  certain  matters, from 
the practice of courts declining to exercise a jurisdiction they possess out of deference.32 The 
latter is a question which the court in Congo did not fully address.33 A more accurate reading 
of the pre-FSIA US case law reveals that insofar as executive determinations that implicated 
the law on state immunity are concerned,  the  courts  “spoke  with  one  voice”  out  of  deference  
and not out of lack of jurisdiction.34 
                                                 
26 Congo at [232-258, 266, 275]. 
27 Congo at [234-252]. 
28 Congo at [257, 276]. 
29 Congo at [324-331]. 
30 F.A. Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp.4, 23-24. 
31 Congo at [266, 275-276, 238-247]. 
32 Lawrence  Collins,  “Foreign  Relations  and  the  Judiciary”  (2002) 51 I.C.L.Q. 485, at 510; P.J.  Yap,  “Congo v 
FG Hemisphere:  Why  Absolute  Immunity  Should  Apply  but  a  Reference  Unnecessary”  (2011)  41  Hong Kong 
Law Journal 393. 
33 The CFA discussed comity but did not expressly address whether the court should defer if it possessed 
jurisdiction. Congo at [279-283, 234-247, 269]. 
34 This reading was also suggested in J.I.  Charney,  “Judicial  Deference  in  Foreign  Relations”  (1989)  83  Am. J. 
Int’l.   L 805;;   C.A.   Bradley,   “Chevron   Deference   and   Foreign   Affairs”   (2000)   86   Virginia Law Review 649; 
William Dobrovir,  “A  Gloss  on  the  Tate  Letter’s  Restrictive  Theory  of  Sovereign  Immunity”  (1968)  54  Virginia 
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Prior to FSIA, US courts had on numerous occasions determined the criteria for 
immunity in the absence of suggestions from the executive.35 Also, the famous Tate Letter 
issued by the State Department to the Attorney-General notifying him of a change in the 
executive’s  policy  from  absolute  to  restrictive  immunity  concluded  that  “a  shift  in  policy  by  
the executive cannot control the courts but…   the courts are less likely to allow a plea of 
sovereign immunity  where  the  executive  has  declined  to  do  so.”36 Finally, in Alfred Dunhill, 
the   US   Supreme   Court   enunciated   restrictive   immunity   as   “the   prevailing   law   of   this  
country.”37 All these contradict an interpretation of pre-FSIA cases as indicating a lack of 
jurisdiction on the part of US courts to decide the law on state immunity. 
 
Hong  Kong’s  constitutional  status 
 
The  majority’s   third   argument   is   it   is   incompatible  with  Hong  Kong’s   constitutional   status  
under the Basic Law to allow it to determine on its own the doctrine of state immunity. Even 
if the common law recognised restrictive immunity and allowed Hong Kong courts to 
pronounce the applicable law on immunity, these common law positions have to be modified, 
or   else   they   would   infringe   Hong   Kong’s   post-handover status.38 The majority gave two 
reasons why this is the case, both of which, I argue, are unconvincing. 
First, the majority contended that Hong Kong is “but a local administrative region” 
(art.12), an “inalienable part” (art.1) of a unitary state, lacking the “very attributes of 
sovereignty” that might enable a federal unit or province to establish its own state immunity 
regime. It is “unheard of” for courts of a region within a unitary state to pronounce a 
divergent state immunity law.39 
This reasoning   places   too   much   emphasis   on   one   element   of   Hong   Kong’s   status   (it  
being part of a unitary state) and overlooks the broader picture, namely, the unique 
constitutional relationship between China and Hong Kong. The Basic Law grants Hong Kong 
                                                                                                                                                        
Law Review 1, at   p.7.  Cf.  Albert  Chen,   “Introduction”   (Focus:   the  Congo  Case) (2011) 41 Hong Kong Law 
Journal 369. 
35 Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (Supreme Court), at p.587; Berizzi Brothers Co v Steamship 
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (Supreme Court); Republic of Mexico v Hoffmann 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (Supreme 
Court). 
36 Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, US Dept. of State, to Acting US Attorney-General Philip 
Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952), emphasis added. 
37 Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v Republic of Cuba 425 U.S. 682 (1976) at p.703 
38 Decision of the NPCSC on Treatment of Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 
160 of the Basic Law , adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National   People’s  
Congress on February 23,  1997  (“1997  Decision”),  para.4. 
39 Congo at [267-268, 319-323] 
9 
 
powers that are wider than that of many federal or autonomous units in the world. Although 
Hong Kong may not participate in diplomatic activities in the name of a state, it has extensive 
powers of conducting external affairs, including powers that are normally only exercisable by 
a sovereign state.40 It is an example of a part of a state given a  “distinct  international  voice”.41 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the fundamental philosophy of the Basic Law is to 
maintain separate systems and allow Hong Kong to enjoy a high degree of autonomy.42 These 
principles are stated to be non-amendable in the Basic Law (art.159(4)), which entrenches a 
particular mechanism for applying national laws in Hong Kong (art.18).  The  NPCSC’s  1997  
Decision specifically envisages that previous laws regarding foreign affairs in Hong Kong 
may still be applicable after the handover, provided (inter alia) that they are subject to 
“national  laws  applied in the  Hong  Kong  Special  Administrative  Region.”43 
Thus, reading the Basic Law holistically, bearing in mind its underlying philosophy and 
the absence of state immunity law extended to Hong Kong, the better view is Hong Kong is 
entitled to retain its previous jurisdiction to decide the law on state immunity in the absence 
of legislation. 
Moreover, the dearth of precedents of a part of a unitary state adopting a different 
doctrine of state immunity is neither here nor there. After all, there is no other example in the 
world of a unitary state granting such an extensive degree of autonomy to its region. Rather 
than look for precedents elsewhere, the court should have determined whether Hong Kong 
can possess its own state immunity regime purely on the basis of interpreting the 
constitutional relationship between the two jurisdictions stipulated in the Basic Law. 
The  majority’s  second  reason  for  the  alleged  incompatibility  is,  if  Hong  Kong  departed  
from  China’s  law on state immunity,  the  latter’s  foreign  relations  would  be  prejudiced.44 The 
majority viewed the issue of whether China would be prejudiced as a fact of state within the 
peculiar cognizance of the Chinese authorities, and   ruled   that   it   was   bound   by   the   latter’s  
affirmative answer on this issue, as expressed through their third letter to the court.45 
The majority did not explain why the issue of prejudice is a fact of state. Indeed, there 
are serious doubts over whether a separate state immunity regime in the context of “one 
                                                 
40 E.g. Hong Kong can enter into treaties and join international organisations which members are usually 
sovereign states, e.g. the WTO. Basic Law Ch.7, art.13(3). 
41 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp.251-
252; R. Mushkat, One Country, Two International Legal Personalities (HK: HK University Press, 1997), pp.65-
66. 
42 Yash Ghai, Hong  Kong’s  New  Constitutional  Order 2nd edn (HK: HK University Press, 2001), pp.222-224. 
43 1997 Decision, para.4(1), emphasis added. 
44 Congo at [269]; 1997 Decision, para.4. 
45 Congo at [290, 361]. 
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country, two systems” would cause such prejudice. The alleged instances of prejudice46 
would only occur if China and states dealing with her expect, in the first place, that a unified 
doctrine of immunity should exist. In particular, China would not be prevented from releasing 
assets to foreign states if she, expecting that a different doctrine of immunity may apply in 
Hong Kong, refrains from placing those assets in Hong Kong.47 The majority erred in 
assuming that a divergent state immunity law would  prejudice  China’s  foreign  relations. 
 
Implications  
 
The above arguments seek to show that the common law meaning of foreign affair and act of 
state clearly excludes the law on state immunity, and such meaning is compatible with the 
Basic Law, reading it from the angle of a common law court. No foreign affair or act of state 
was involved in the case. The minority was right in concluding that arts 13 and 19 did not 
come into play at all. There was no need to interpret these provisions to dispose of the case, 
accordingly no need to ask the NPCSC to interpret them. If the CFA had correctly applied the 
common law approach to interpretation, it would have found that it had jurisdiction to decide 
the law on state immunity in Hong Kong. Through a series of misjudgements, the majority 
failed to secure the maximum common law space it was entitled to in the absence of a prior 
interpretation issued by the NPCSC. 
The  majority’s   ruling  has implications on Hong  Kong’s   judicial autonomy, despite the 
NPCSC’s   powers   of   interpretation.  Even if the CFA had decided that it had jurisdiction to 
determine the doctrine of state immunity and refused to seek reference, and the NPCSC 
subsequently initiated an overriding interpretation on   the   court’s   jurisdictional   limits, such 
interpretation could not reverse the decision that the CFA had already given. Thus, the CFA’s  
ruling failed to secure the maximum boundary of autonomy at least in relation to the case in 
question. 
More  importantly,  the  majority’s  expansive reasoning for concluding that state immunity 
is outside the   court’s   jurisdiction   potentially reduces the jurisdictional space available to 
future courts in relation to issues other than state immunity. Previous case law illustrates that 
Hong Kong courts will confine as far as possible the binding effect of an NPCSC 
interpretation to the specific subject matter of the interpretation.48 So future courts will limit 
                                                 
46 Congo at [211]. 
47 I thank Tony Carty for pointing this out. 
48 Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533. 
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the impact of any NPCSC interpretation issued in relation to Congo to the question of 
whether the doctrine of state immunity is a foreign affair. As things turned out, this confining 
process will be facilitated by the fact that the questions for reference were phrased and 
answered in a confined manner. In the Interpretation, the NPCSC merely stated its conclusion 
that Hong Kong has no jurisdiction to determine the doctrine of state immunity without 
elaborating its reasoning.49  
Contrarily, we are less certain as to how future courts would   treat   the   majority’s 
indiscriminate reasoning   on   “the nature   of   sovereign   immunity”, which, if taken seriously, 
would strip Hong Kong courts of jurisdiction over all issues that concern relations between 
states – regardless of whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is compatible with the Basic 
Law and whether the Chinese authorities had imposed a stance on these issues. Under the 
majority’s  logic,  courts  in  Hong  Kong  would  no  longer  be  able  to  rule  on  refoulement  issues  
if the home state pressurised China for repatriation; nor would courts be able to rule on any 
issue of customary international law.50 Any determination made by China on these issues of 
law would constitute unchallengeable acts of state. Whenever such questions arise, arts 13 
and/or 19 would automatically kick in and judicial reference might have to be sought. Such 
reasoning   potentially   ousts   the   court’s   jurisdiction   over   many   matters   it   is   entitled   to  
adjudicate on in the absence of a prior NPCSC interpretation. If future courts construe the 
ratio of Congo broadly to encompass a definition of the excluding concepts, or if they simply 
continue  to  adopt  the  majority’s  line  of  reasoning in defining such concepts, their jurisdiction 
may be curbed in ways that go beyond the dictates of the Interpretation; China’s  fundamental  
framework for bringing about reunification, namely, high degree of autonomy and co-
existence of diverse systems, would be eroded.  
Undeniably, given that the majority’s   expansive   reasoning   coincided with that of the 
NPCSC’s,  as shown in the letters and the explanatory note to the Interpretation, the NPCSC 
may at any time issue a binding definition of the excluding concepts that reflect such 
reasoning. However, previous experience shows that the Chinese authorities are pragmatic 
and will not initiate an interpretation of the Basic Law if they do not have vested interest in 
the matter.51 Indeed, they seemed unbothered in the past with Hong Kong courts determining 
                                                 
49 Some reasoning is given in the Explanatory Note to the Interpretation, which, unlike the Interpretation itself, 
is non-binding on courts. 
50 For commercial implications, see  C.L.Lim,  “Beijing's 'Congo' Interpretation,  Commercial  Implications” 
(2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 6. 
51 Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533. 
12 
 
issues   that   “concern   relations   between   states”.52 The majority’s   reasoning, if followed by 
future courts, may substantially reduce the bounded yet significant common law space that 
the constitutional framework has given Hong  Kong’s  judiciary: bounded because it is limited 
by   the  NPCSC’s   theoretically unlimited powers of interpretation, yet significant because of 
the practical brakes on the exercise of such powers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Before Congo, we were in the dark as to how courts in Hong Kong would define foreign 
affair and act of state. Congo has replaced uncertainty with anxiety. We now know for sure 
that these terms cover questions of law, specifically, the law on state immunity. The 
judgment left hanging in the air what other issues of law would the court also consider as 
being outside its jurisdiction.   The   majority’s   reasoning   on   “the   nature of sovereign 
immunity” suggests that potentially all issues that concern relations between states may be so 
excluded, regardless of whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is consistent with the Basic 
Law. Whilst future courts will remain bound by the Interpretation on the doctrine of state 
immunity, one can only hope that they would endeavour to preserve the foundations of the 
unique constitutional relationship between China and Hong Kong by disregarding the 
majority’s  overbroad  reasoning, and fully exploiting the autonomous space they are entitled 
to in the absence of binding interpretations from China. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 See note 4. 
